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Quiz Daniela Goya-Tocchetto, Matthew Echols, and Jen Wright: The Lottery of Life and Moral Desert: An Empirical Investigation

○ one correct answer · ▢ one or more correct answers

1. A well-familiar question to begin with… What is this article's main approach?

- ○ a. armchair philosophy
- ○ b. experimental philosophy
- ○ c. empirical philosophy

2. Suppose I have $1000. One evening I decide to go to the casino, play roulette and lose all of it. This loss can then mainly be attributed, in the terminology of luck egalitarian philosophers, to…

- ○ a. option luck
- ○ b. constitutive luck
- ○ c. neither brute luck nor option luck nor constitutive luck
- ○ d. brute luck

3. Let's stay with the above example. Suppose that because I lost my $1000 I can no longer afford to have a sufficiently healthy diet (though I still have enough to eat in terms of calories, so there is no risk of starving). Should this fact be considered in distributing goods, e.g., in the sense that I am given more goods so that I can afford a healthy diet again? A yes-answer to this question is most likely to be given by…

- ○ a. desert-based theorists such as Miller
- ○ b. luck egalitarians such as Dworkin
- ○ c. liberal egalitarians such as Rawls

4. According to the „brute luck constraint“ (as shared by both liberal egalitarians and luck egalitarians) judgements about how to distribute resources should…

- ○ a. not reflect social brute luck
- ○ b. reflect social brute luck
- ○ c. both reflect social and natural brute luck
- ○ d. neither reflect social nor natural brute luck

5. Freiman and Nichols’ study suggests that ordinary people…

- ○ a. sometimes accept and sometimes reject the brute luck constraint
- ○ b. accept the brute luck constraint
- ○ c. reject the brute luck constraint

6. What did Goya-Tocchetto et al. find in their new studies?

- ☐ a. intuitions about natural luck differ from intuitions about social luck
- ☐ b. different kinds of natural luck (e.g., the natural talents of singers vs. scientists) trigger different intuitions
- ☐ c. abstract intuitions about desert differ from concrete intuitions but only under very specific circumstances
- ☐ d. cases involving deontological moral terms trigger different intuitions than cases involving consequentialist terms
- ☐ e. intuitions about desert and fairness come apart to a very large extent
- ☐ f. cases involving advantages trigger the same intuitions about desert as cases about disadvantages

7. Goya-Tocchetto et al. found that income differences that result from differing advantages are perceived as less fair than income differences that result from differing disadvantages.

- ○ True
- ○ False

8. Goya-Tocchetto et al. found that people regard inequalities that result from social luck (e.g., loving vs. non-loving parents) as less deserved and fair than inequalities that result from natural luck (e.g., higher vs. lower IQ).

- ○ True
- ○ False

9. Why do Goya-Tocchetto et al. mainly take their empirical data to be relevant to the philosophical debate about the role of desert in theories of distributive justice?

- ○ a. This evidence sheds light on the reliability of moral intuitions about brute luck, and hence on whether philosophers should take these intuitions as evidence for their theories
- ○ b. This evidence sheds light on the feasibility of such theories, i.e., the extent to which ordinary people will or can be made to accept the theory if it is implemented
- ○ c. This evidence provides direct evidence for theories of distributive justice, as these theories are to be measured solely by how well they capture folk intuitions
- ○ d. This evidence sheds light on whether Rawls was right to assume that parties in the original position would choose the difference principle
- ○ e. This evidence sheds light on whether philosophers are justified to distinguish brute luck from option luck

10. Last week we found Lindauer arguing that empirical data can be relevant to the analysis of normative concepts in virtue of illuminating these concepts' "fruitfulness". How does this view relate to Goya-Tocchetto et al.'s paper (in particular, do their own interpretation of the normative relevance of their data)? Do they fit well? Less well? And why?